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Abstract: In 2000, Hwang and Li proposed a new remote user authentication 
scheme using smart cards. In the same year, Chan and Cheng pointed out that 
Hwang and Li’s scheme is not secure against the masquerade attack. Further, in 
2003, Shen, Lin and Hwang pointed out a different type of attack on Hwang and 
Li’s scheme and presented a modified scheme to remove its security pitfalls. 
This paper presents an improved scheme which is secure against Chan-Cheng 
and all the extended attacks. 
Index Terms: Authentication, cryptography, remote user, network security, 
password and smart card.  
 
Introduction: Remote user password based authentication scheme, proposed by 
Lamport [14] in 1981, is a way to authenticate the remote user over an insecure 
channel. In Lamport’s scheme, the AS stores a password table at the server to 
check the validity of the login request made by the user. However, high hash 
overhead and the necessity for password resetting decrease the suitability and 
practical ability of Lamport’s scheme. Since then, many similar schemes [18]-[20] 
have been proposed. They all have a common feature: a verification password 
table should be securely stored in the AS. Actually, this property is a 
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disadvantage for the security point of view. Unfortunately, the AS will be partially 
or totally braked/affected, if the password table is stolen /removed /modified by 
an antagonist/adversary. 
Password authentication schemes with smart cards have a long history in the 
remote user authentication environment. So far different types of password 
authentication schemes with smarts cards [2]-[3]-[4]-[5]-[9]-[10]-[11]-[13]-[17]-
[21]-[23] have been proposed. In 2000, Hwang and Li [16] proposed a new 
remote user authentication scheme using smart cards, which was based on 
ElGamal cryptosystem [22]. This scheme does not maintain the password table 
to check the validity of the login request. Also, it can withstand message-
replaying attack. Chan and Cheng [7] pointed out the security weaknesses of 
Hwang and Li’s Scheme and show that a legitimate user can easily create a valid 
pair of (ID , PW ) without knowing the secret key xs of the authentication server. 
In 2003, Shen-Lin- Hwang [11] discussed a different attack on the Hwang-Li’s 
scheme and they also proposed a modified scheme to remove the security 
pitfalls of Hwang-Li’s scheme.  In the same year, Chang and Hwang [1] 
explained the practical problems of the Chan – Cheng’s attack on the Hwang-Li’s 
scheme. Further, Leung - Cheng, - Fong and Chen [12] pointed out that the 
Shen-Lin-Hwang’s scheme is still vulnerable to the attack proposed by Chan and 
Cheng. 
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Contributions: This paper presents an improved remote user authentication with 
smart cards. The improved scheme is secure against Chan – Cheng, Chan- 
Hwang and Shen-Lin- Hwang’s extended attacks. 
 
Organization: Section 2 reviews the Hwang – Li’s scheme. Section 3 describes 
the cryptanalysis of Hwang – Li’s scheme. Section 4 reviews the Shen-Lin-
Hwang’s scheme. Section 5 describes the security pitfall in the Shen-Lin-
Hwang’s scheme. An improved remote user authentication with smart card is 
proposed in section 6. Section 7 discusses the security of the improved scheme. 
Finally, comes to a conclusion in the section 8. 
 
Notations: The notations used through out in this paper can be summarized as 
follows: 
U denotes the remote user. 
ID denotes the identity of the remote user U. 
PW denotes the password corresponding to the registered identity ID. 
AS denotes the authentication server. 
xs denotes the permanent secret key of the authentication server. 
f ( .) denotes a cryptographic one way hash function. 
 denotes a secret channel between the remote user U and the 
authentication server AS. 
 denotes a public channel (insecure channel)   between the remote user U 
and the authentication server AS. 
p denotes a large prime number. 
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⊕  denotes XORed operation. 
µ denotes a random number generated by the AS at the time of registration 
of the user U. 
REVIEW OF THE HWANG-LI’S SCHEME: There are three phases in the Hwang-Li’s 
scheme: the registration phase, login phase and the authentication phase. In the 
registration phase, the user U sends a request to the AS for the registration. The 
AS will issue a smart card and a password to every legal user through a secure 
channel. In the login Phase, when the user U wants to access the AS, she/he 
inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys the identity and 
the password to access services. In the authentication phase, the AS checks the 
validity of the login request. 
 
Registration Phase: A user U
 
submits her/his ID to the AS. AS computes the 
password PW
 
for the user U, as, PW
 
= ID
 
xs
 mod p, where, xs is a secret key 
maintained by the AS and p is a large prime number. AS provides a password 
PW and a smart card to the user U through a secure channel. The smart card 
contains the public parameters (f, p), where f a one-way function. 
 
Login Phase: User U
 
attaches her/his smart card to the smart card reader and 
keys ID
 
and PW. The smart card will perform the following operations:  
Generate a random number r. 
Compute  C1=  ID r  mod  p.  
Compute  t = f (T ⊕ PW ) mod p – 1, where T  is the  current date and time of 
the smart card reader. 
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Compute  M = ID t  mod  p.  
Compute  C2= M (PW)r  mod  p.  
Sends a login request C = (ID, C1, C2, T) to the AS. 
Authentication Phase: Assume AS receives the message C at time Tc , where Tc 
is the current date and time at AS. Then the AS takes the following action: 
Check the format of ID. If the identity format is not correct, then AS will rejects 
this login request. 
Check, whether Tc – T ≤ ∆ T, where ∆ T is the legal time interval due to 
transmission delay, if not, then rejects the login request C. 
Check, if C2 (C1xs)-1 
?
=  (ID) f (T ⊕ PW) mod p, then the AS accepts the login request. 
Otherwise, the login request will be rejected. 
 
Cryptanalysis of the Hwang- Li’s Scheme: This section discusses the security 
weakness of the Hwang – Li’s scheme. 
 
Chan and Cheng’s Attack: Impersonation Attack: According to Chan and Cheng 
[7], a legal user Alice can easily generate a valid pair of identity and password 
without the knowledge of secrete key ‘xs’ of AS. Alice uses her valid pair (IDA, 
PWA) to generate another valid pair (IDB, PWB) as follows: 
Alice computes IDB = (IDA × IDA) mod p. Then, she can compute the 
corresponding password PWB = IDB
xs
 mod p = (IDA × IDA) xs mod p   = (PWA × 
PWA) mod p. As a result, Alice can generate a valid pair (IDB, PWB) without 
knowing the secret key xs.  
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Shen-Lin-Hwang’s Attack: Masquerading Attack: According to Shen - Lin and 
Hwang [11] masquerading attack is possible on Hwang- Li’s scheme. A user Bob 
can masquerade another user Alice to login a remote server and gain access 
right. Bob computes an identity IDB = IDA
k
 mod p, where k is a random number 
such that gcd (k, p) = 1.Then, he submits this identity IDB to AS for registration. 
AS provides a smart card and a password PWB = IDB
xs
 mod p. With the 
knowledge of PWB, Bob can compute the password PWA related to the identity 
IDA, as, PWA = IDA
xs
 mod p = PWB– k mod  p. As a result, Bob can masquerade 
as Alice to login a remote server and gain access privilege. 
 
Chang- Hwang’s Attack: According to Chang and Hwang [1], there is a mistake 
in the Chan- Cheng’s attack. It is not always possible that the square of a legal 
identity satisfies the specific identity format. Chang and Hwang generalized the 
Chan- Cheng’s attack. They described two attacks.  
 
Attack- Ι: Alice computes IDB = IDA
k
 mod p, where k is a random number. Then, 
he can compute the corresponding password PWB = PWA k mod p. As a result, a 
legal user Alice can impersonate other user Bob with a valid pair of (IDB, PWB) to 
login the AS. If IDA is a primitive root of Zp, then all the valid identities and their 
corresponding password can be generated easily. 
 
Attack- ΙΙ: A group of eavesdroppers may cooperate to generate a valid pair of 
identity (IDG, PWG ), as IDG =∏ IDAj mod p and PWG = ∏ PWAj mod p. Chang 
and Hwang pointed out that in Hwang – Li’s scheme, it is still difficult to obtain 
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the corresponding password for a known arbitrary valid identity, but once the 
valid identity is generated, its corresponding password will be obtained easily. 
 
Shen, Lin and Hwang’s scheme:  Shen-Lin-Hwang [11] proposed a modified 
remote user authentication scheme to solve the security pitfall of the Hwang-Li’s 
scheme. Shen-Lin-Hwang’s scheme uses the concept of hiding the identity to 
prevent the masquerading attack. They modified the registration phase, now a 
shadow identity SID will be issued to the legal user. This modified in the 
registration phase is described below. 
 
Modified Registration Phase: A user U
 
submits her/his identity string J
 
to the AS 
for the registration. The string J contains the name, address, unique number etc. 
This information in the string J is unique for every user. Then the AS computes a 
pair (SID, PW) for the user U after the identity J is identified. The pair (SID, PW) 
is computed as SID = Red (J) and PW = (SID) xs mod p, where, Red (.) is a 
shadow identity of device which is only maintained in the remote server and SID
 
is the shadow identity of the user U. Furthermore, the AS distributes the smart 
card and (SID, PW) to the user U in a secure way. The smart card contains the 
public parameters (f, p). In this scheme, the message sent to the AS now 
contains (SID, C1, C2, T). Because Ji specially formatted, the evil user cannot 
compute new identity string Ji via SIDi. 
 
Cryptanalysis of the Shen, Lin and Hwang’s Scheme: According to Leung-
Cheng-Fong-Chan [12], Shen-Lin-Hwang’s scheme [11] defends the attacks of 
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registration for a new identity IDB via IDA for a legal user Alice. They also pointed 
out that the modified scheme is still vulnerable to the attack described by Chan 
and Cheng. They showed that the modified scheme is not secure against the 
attack that is similar to Chan - Cheng and Chang – Hwang’s attacks. If we 
replace IDA with SIDA, then the Chang and Hwang’s attack will work as follows. 
Alice computes SIDB= (SIDA) k mod p, where k is a random number. Then, he 
can compute the corresponding password PWB = PWA k mod p. As a result, a 
legal user Alice can impersonate other user Bob with a valid pair of (SIDB, PWB) 
to login the AS. If SIDA is a primitive root of Zp, then all the valid identities and 
their corresponding password can be generated easily. Since, Chan – Cheng’s 
attack is one case of this attack so it also works well. 
 
An Improved Scheme: This section presents an improved remote user 
authentication scheme to remove the security pitfalls of the original scheme: 
Hwang – Li’s scheme. This improved scheme overcomes the security flaws of 
Hwang – Li’s scheme, which are described in the previous sections. The 
improved scheme has four phases: initial phase, registration phase, login phase 
and verification phase. These phases are described below. 
Initial Phase: First, the insider at AS initialized the same public and secret 
parameters, as in Hwang –Li’s scheme.  
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Registration Phase: For our requirement, we have modified the registration 
phase of Hwang and Li’s scheme. Assume that this phase is executed over a 
secure channel. The following steps are involved in this phase. 
 
Step R1. U  AS: J. The string J contains the name of the user U, address, 
identity ID and a unique identification number etc, which are unique for the user 
U.  
Step R2. AS generates a random number µ and then computes m = f (ID
 
⊕ µ) 
mod p and the password PW for the user U, as, PW = [ f (ID
 
⊕ µ)] xs mod p. 
Step R3. AS  U: a smart card containing the public parameters (f, p) and a pair 
(IDµ, PW) to the user U.  
After the registration, the identity ID of the user has two parts: ID and µ. The 
second part µ is induced by the AS after registration. 
 
Login Phase: Whenever, the user U wants to gain the access right on the AS, 
then the following steps are involved for the proper execution of this phase. 
Step L1. U attaches her/his smart card to the smart card reader at any time T
 
and keys her/his identity IDµ and the corresponding PW.  
Step L2.  The smart card of the user U conducts the following computations: 
Generate a random number r. 
Computes C1= f (ID ⊕ µ) r mod p.  
Compute t = f (T ⊕ PW) mod p –1. 
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Compute M = (ID) t mod  p.  
Compute C2= M (PW )r  mod  p.  
Step L3. U  AS: LR = (IDµ, C1, C2, T). 
 
Verification Phase: Assume that the AS receives the login request LR at time Tc. 
Then, AS does the following computations to check the validity of the login 
request LR. 
Step V1.  Check the specific format of the identity IDµ. If the format of the 
identity is incorrect, then AS rejects the login request LR.  
Step V2.   Check, whether Tc – T ≤ ∆T, where ∆T is the legal time interval due to 
transmission delay, if not, then AS rejects the login request LR. 
Step V3.  Check, if C2
?
=  (C1xs) (ID) f (T ⊕ PW) mod p, then the AS accepts the login 
request. Otherwise, the login request will be rejected by AS. 
Security Analysis of the Improved Scheme: The above scheme is a modified 
form of the original scheme: Hwang-Li’s scheme. The security analysis has been 
already discussed and demonstrated in [16]. Therefore, this section will only 
discuss the enhanced security features of the proposed scheme.  
 
Chan- Cheng’s attack: Impersonation Attack: Consider an antagonist/adversary, 
Alice wants to create another valid pair (IDBµB, PWB) such that PWB = [f (IDB ⊕ 
µB)] xs mod p, by using her valid pair (IDAµA , PWA ), which is provided by the AS 
to Alice through registration phase. In our scheme, this is infeasible to compute 
such a valid pair (IDBµB, PWB) due to the one - way property of hash function f.  
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Since, now the computed hash value  [ f (IDB ⊕ µB )] will not be equal to  [ f (IDA 
⊕ µA)] × [ f (IDA ⊕ µA )], then Chan – Cheng’s attack will not work.  
Chang- Hwang’s Attack: Since, Chang- Hwang’s Attack is an extended form of 
Chen- Cheng’s attack, then this attack will also not work. 
 
Shen-Lin-Hwang’s attack: In Shen- Lin- Hwang’s attack, suppose Bob is an 
adversary/attacker who wants to masquerade any valid user Alice. To create a 
favorable results for a successful attack, first the malicious user, Bob has to 
registered himself at AS. For this purpose, Bob intercepts the logon request LR = 
(IDAµA, C1, C2, T) from a public network and computes an identity IDB = IDAk 
mod p or IDB = [f (IDA ⊕ µA)] k mod p, where k is a random number such that gcd 
(k, p) = 1.Then, he submits this identity IDB to AS for registration. Now, AS 
provides a smart card and a pair (IDµB, PWB), where, PWB = [f (IDB ⊕ µB)] xs 
mod p to the antagonist user Bob. Now with the knowledge of PWB, Bob will try 
to compute the password PWA related to the identity IDA. On the one hand, If 
Bob submits the identity IDB = IDA
k
 mod p, then he can try to computes the 
password PWA related to the identity IDA, by using the relation: 
  PWA *  = PWB– k    mod p =  [f (IDB ⊕ µB) xs] – k  mod p  =  [f (IDB ⊕ µB) – k] xs mod 
p, 
                        [f (IDA ⊕ µA)] xs   mod p   PWA. 
Thus, the antagonist/attacker can compute only a fictious value PWA* = [f (IDB ⊕ 
µB) – k] xs mod p, which is different from the integral/authentic/existing password 
PWA = (IDA ⊕ µA)xs mod p. On the other hand, If antagonist Bob submits the 
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identity IDB = [f (IDA ⊕ µA)] k mod p, then also he can try to computes the 
password PWA related to the identity IDA. With the similar reason, as described 
above, the antagonist Bob can not compute the integral/authentic/existing 
password PWA = (IDA ⊕ µA)xs mod p. In this way, Bob is not able to compute the 
actual password PWA related to the identity IDA. Thus the antagonist Bob can not 
masquerade as another user Alice to login a remote server. As a result, the 
improved scheme successfully withstands the masquerade attack: Shen-Lin-
Hwang’s attack 
 
Conclusion: This paper proposed an improved remote user authentication 
scheme, which removes the security flaws of the original scheme: Hwang-Li’s 
scheme. The proposed scheme is secure against all the attacks: Shen- Lin- 
Hwang’s attack, Chan- Cheng’s attack and Chang- Hwang’s Attack. 
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